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SQUEEZE-OUT MERGERS AND THE "NEW"
APPRAISAL REMEDY
ROBERT B. THOMPSON*
As the title to Professor Steinberg's and Ms. Lindahl's article sug-
gests, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.,' has produced a "new" law of squeeze-out mergers. This "new"
law is the latest judicial response to the possibility of majority share-
holder overreaching of minority shareholder rights in a squeeze-out
merger. It is the third such judicial effort since statutory and judicial
changes in the 1960s completed the legitimization of cash-out mergers.2
In contrast to courts in the two previous eras, the Weinberger court em-
phasized the appraisal process, albeit a new and improved version, as
the primary protection for minority shareholders who have been vic-
timized by the flexibility bestowed upon majority shareholders by the
cash-out merger laws. This Article surveys this "appraisal era" in the
law of squeeze-out mergers. Part I places the Weinberger approach
within the historical context of prior law regulating squeeze-out merg-
ers. Part II focuses on the Delaware court's use of the appraisal statute
to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty, in particular, an insider's conflict
of interest, a process which substitutes the statutory procedure for the
broad flexible concepts developed by the courts of equity. Part III sug-
gests that even if the appraisal statute can perform this broader func-
* Professor of Law, Washington University, B.A., 1971, Vanderbilt Univ., J.D., 1974, Univ.
of Virginia. Some of the topics addressed in this Article are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5
of F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d Ed.
1985)(forthcoming). I would like to express my thanks to Dean O'Neal for his permission to draw
ideas from the first edition of that treatise and for his assistance in this project.
1. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
2. Cash-out mergers and squeeze-out mergers are roughly synonymous terms that refer to
mergers by which majority shareholders eliminate one or more of the other owners of the enter-
prise by forcing the minority to exchange their equity position in a corporation for cash or some
other non-equity interest. (To the extent that "squeeze-out" includes transactions which use non-
cash, but non-equity participation, it may be a broader term.) Other writers use "freeze-out" or
"take-out" to describe the same type of transactions. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissent-
Iag Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1193 (1964) (freeze-out has come to
imply a purpose to force a liquidation or sale of a stockholder's shares not incident to some other
wholesome business goal); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Merger.r .4 Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 625 n.3 (1981) (sees take-out as neutral term and squeeze-out or freeze-out as
more prejorative).
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tion in publicly held corporations, the Weinberger approach is not
appropriate for closely held corporations. In closely held corporations,
shareholders enter the enterprise with much different expectations and
greater potential exists for the majority shareholder to abuse the minor-
ity because of the greater uncertainty in valuing shares.
I. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE LEGITIMIZATION OF SQUEEZE-OUT
MERGERS
Modem state statutes governing fundamental corporate changes re-
flect an evolution toward simplified procedures that provide greater
flexibility for managers to structure corporate transactions and less op-
portunity for minority shareholders to prevent or delay such changes.3
These statutory developments make it easier for directors and control-
ling shareholders to utilize mergers and other fundamental corporate
changes to squeeze out minority shareholders. Weinberger can be un-
derstood better if placed within this historical context.
At common law unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite
to fundamental changes in a corporation. Each shareholder had a con-
tract that created vested rights in the corporation and the corporation
could not change these rights without the shareholder's consent.4 This
3. One commentator gave the following argument for statutes that relax the requirements
for fundamental corporate changes:
As a corporation loses its neighborhood aspect and takes on the character of a political
institution, it is of national concern that the corporation have flexibility to adapt itself to
new challenges and new problems arising in our ever-changing economy. It becomes
necessary that rearrangement of its capitalization with the shifting tides of business need
should be accomplished like other practical decisions. This means that changes can be
made by the majority within the procedural limitations set up by statute to safeguard the
minority from abuse. No veto by a small group can be tolerated. However suitable the
rule of unanimity might be for a partnership, it is wholly unsuited to political
institutions.
Gibson, How Fixed are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 283, 291 (1958).
See Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Management Conduct, 31
Bus. LAw. 1031, 1042 (1976) (state statutes reveal a "pattern of increasing managerial discretion
and diminishing shareholder rights"); see also Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority
Shareholders, and Business Purpose, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 69; O'Neal & Magill, Cali-
fornia's New Close Corporation Legislation, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1155 (1976); Schulman & Schenk,
Shareholder's Voting and Appraisal Rights in Corporate Acquisition Transactions, 38 Bus. LAW.
1529 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Geddes v.
Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1921); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 409 (N.J.
Ch. 1853); Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholders'Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 307 (1958).
The highwater mark of the "vested rights" theory was perhaps reached in the Delaware case of
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rule enabled arbitrary or unscrupulous shareholders, often a small mi-
nority, to use the nuisance value of their shares to exact unfair conces-
sions from the majority by blocking or threatening to block desirable
corporate changes. In response most states enacted statutes that au-
thorized nonunanimous approval of charter amendments, mergers,
consolidations, sales of substantially all of the corporation's assets or
other fundamental corporate actions.5 Many modem statutes require
only a vote of a bare majority of shares to approve a merger.6
When legislators abrogated the unanimous shareholder consent rule,
they often enacted appraisal or dissenters' rights statutes, which gave
dissenting shareholders the option to withdraw from the enterprise and
receive fair value for their shares whenever the majority shareholders
changed the fundamental nature of the enterprise.7 One commentator
described the considerations leading to the enactment of the early ap-
praisal statutes as follows:
It was also realized that it was necessary to afford some relief to dissent-
ers; that, though a small group should not be able to prevent the majority
from doing with the corporation what they thought wise, yet the minority
should not be forced to continue in an enterprise radically different from
the venture on which they originally embarked, or in an essentially al-
tered state. The result in most jurisdictions was a compromise conferring
on the dissenters the right to receive cash value of their stock and provid-
Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 412, 190 A. 115, 125 (1936). The court held that a
preferred shareholder's right to accumulated dividends must, where the law at the time the stock
was issued did not provide for their elimination, "be regarded as a vested right of property secured
against destruction by the Federal and State constitutions." More recent decisions, however, seem
to have been virtually abandoned the vested rights theory. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
41 Del. Ch. 74, 76, 188 A.2d 123, 125 (1963); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318,
332-35, 11 A.2d 331, 338-39 (1940); see also Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944,
951 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945); cf. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corpo-
tateLaw, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 875, 878 n.10 (describes Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) as a modem expression of the vested rights theory).
5. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 33-355, 33-360(b), 33-372(d), 33-376(c) (West
1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw, § 903(a)(2), 909(a)(3), 1001 (McKinney 1968); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN., §§ 1701.71(A), 1701.79(B), 1701.86(E) (Page 1978).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 903(a)(4)-(6) (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 242(b)(2) (Replacement Volume 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.18(1) (West 1984); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 21.197(615) (Callaghan 1983); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:9-3(2)(d) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw, § 804(a)(3) (McKinney 1963); OHIo REv. CODE ANN., § 1701.71(b) (Page 1978); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 60(e) (1979).
7. See Manning, The Shareholder Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE
UJ. 223, 246-47 (1962).
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ing for an appraisal where no agreement could be reached.8
The early statutes that authorized mergers and consolidations con-
templated that the shareholders of the constituent companies would re-
ceive shares in the surviving corporation. 9 While the provisions of
these appraisal statutes gave minority shareholders the option to have
the corporation buy their shares, the corporation could not force the
minority shareholders to sell. Subsequent amendments to the merger
statutes permitting cash as consideration in a merger'0 and authorizing
"short-form" mergers" provided a direct mechanism for the majority
shareholder to eliminate minority shareholders involuntarily from the
enterprise through a cash payment, subject only to the minority share-
holders' right to pursue the appraisal option. While some evidence
suggests the legislatures did not intend these changes to authorize the
elimination of minority shareholders,' 2 courts came to interpret the
8. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L. REV.
420, 421 (1930). See also Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 149, 172 A. 452, 455 (1934)
(dissenting shareholder given the option to retire and receive value of stock); M. EISENBERO, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORTION § 7.2 (1976) ("The appraisal right is a mechanism admirably
suited to reconcile . . . the need to give the majority the right to make drastic changes . . . to
meet new conditions as they arise, with the need to protect the minority against being involunta-
rily dragged along into a drastically restructured enterprise in which it has no confidence.").
9. See Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 517, 154 A.2d 893, 895
(1959) (the early Delaware statute did not permit the payment of cash for shares surrendered in a
merger or consolidation; it provided that "the merger agreement must state the manner of con-
verting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares of the resulting corporation").
10. See Weiss, supra note 2 at 632-41. Florida's corporate code provided for distributions of
cash, notes or bonds as early as 1925 while three other states added similar provisions in the next
decade. Widespread use of cash as permissible consideration in long-form mergers, however, did
not occur until the 1960s. New York authorized cash as consideration in its long-form merger
statute in 1961, Delaware in 1967, New Jersey in 1968, and the Model Business Corporation Act in
1969. Legislatures authorized cash as consideration for short-form mergers somewhat earlier.
11. SeeW. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATtONS 1464 (5th ed.
1980). A short-form merger statute typically permits a company to merge with a subsidiary of
which it owns 90 percent, requiring only the approval of the parent company's board of directors.
Under the terms of the merger, the parent can designate that minority shareholders will receive
cash for their shares instead of equity securities in the surviving corporation.
12. See Weiss, supra note 2, at 641. Professor Weiss suggests that the legislative purpose of
short-form merger statutes and permitting cash as consideration was to provide corporate manag-
ers with greater flexibility in structuring corporate combinations, but not to effect a squeeze-out.
See also Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions andReorganizations,
71 CALIF. L. REv. 1072, 1097 n.69 (1983).
Another commentator concluded that changes in the federal tax laws, which permitted triangu-
lar mergers and other more complex reorganizations to be treated as nontaxable reorganizations,
motivated state legislatures to enact cash short-form merger statutes:
I do not believe that anyone in these amendments foresaw what has developed since
then. The drafters of the [New York] legislation that permitted the use of cash consider-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/3
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provisions as permitting that result. 13
As the flexibility given to the majority shareholders increased, courts
recognized the potential for abuse, particularly when the appraisal pro-
ceeding could be avoided or did not produce fair value, and imposed
equitable limits on the majority's broad statutory squeeze-out powers. 14
Some federal courts responded by using an anti-fraud provision of the
federal securities law, the versatile rule l0b-5,I5 to reach unfair actions
by directors and controlling shareholders who owed fiduciary duties to
the corporation and its minority shareholders.' 6 Federal courts applied
this "new fraud" concept when a controlling shareholder used a short
form merger statute to squeeze out minority shareholders in situations
where the appraisal remedy was inadequate and the transaction lacked
a business purpose.17
The Supreme Court called a halt to this broad interpretation of se-
ation in a merger as a means of providing greater flexibility under the tax law probably
did not foresee that it would also be used as a means to eliminate minority shareholders.
Nevertheless, it was not long before that potential was recognized.
Robinson, Elimination of Minority Shareholders, 61 N.C.L. REv. 515, 517 (1983).
13. See e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 9, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962) (real
purpose of short-form merger act was to give the majority shareholder a convenient means to cash
out the minority); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971)
(principle extended to long-form merger); Wilcox v. Stem, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 201-02, 219 N.E.2d 401,
404, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38,43 (1966) (minority shareholders can be cashed out in short-form mergers).
But see Weiss, supra note 2, at 651 (Stauffer statement of purpose for short-form merger statute
unsupported by legislative authority; short-form merger statute enacted largely to simplify and
facilitate parent-subsidiary mergers where they promoted operational efficiency).
14. Some courts were influenced by transactions in which public stockholders who had in-
vested in companies during "hot issues" markets were squeezed out of these corporations at a
much lower price only a short time later during a period in which the markets were generally
depressed. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (1975); see
also Address by A.A. Sommer Jr., SEC Commissioner, "Going Private:" A Lesson in Corporate
Responsibility, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 14, 1974), reprinted in, [1974-75 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 80,010 at 84,695.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus. Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2nd Cir. 1976) (short-form
merger, lob-5 reaches "breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against a minority without any
change of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure"), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.) (proxy statement fully disclosed lack of corporate purpose of
merger of corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary of the controlling shareholders; the court
found that the merger violated rule lOb-5), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Bryan v.
Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (proposed squeeze-out merger a course
of business that would operate as fraud or deceit), a'd, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) (relying on
state law).
17. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976) (10b-5 reaches
breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure), rey'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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curities fraud in its watershed 1977 decision, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green.'8 Significantly, the Court based its decision on the limits of the
federal securities statute and not on any substantive approval of the
majority shareholder's activity. The Court suggested that a need for
federal fiduciary standards may exist, but held that the federal courts
can not create these standards under the language of section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' 9
Responding to this and other more explicit calls for federal action to
preempt traditional state law regulation,20 the Delaware Supreme
Court broadened the use of state law fiduciary duty concepts to limit
the majority's statutory rights. In Singer v. Magnavox Co., 2 1 the court
held that a merger for the sole purpose of squeezing out minority share-
holders was a breach of the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty.22
Further, the court reduced its prior emphasis on appraisal proceedings
and permitted the minority shareholders challenging a merger to bring
suits in equity for damages or other relief3 Subsequent cases pro-
duced two not necessarily complimentary results. On one hand, courts
defined the "business purpose" aspect of a majority shareholder's fidu-
ciary duty so broadly that any transaction could meet this test.24 On
the other hand, courts permitted plaintiffs alleging such fiduciary duty
claims to bring suits in equity and avoid cumbersome appraisal pro-
ceedings even when their only disagreement with the majority was over
18. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
19. Id at 479.
20. In addition to the Supreme Court's reference to possible federal legislation, movement in
that direction had been spurred by Professor William Cary's critical article of Delaware's corpo-
rate laws. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Some Jeflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
21. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
22. Id at 978.
23. In Singer, the court held that a complaint which alleges that the majority completed a
merger solely to freeze out minority shareholders "states a cause of action for violation of a fiduci-
ary duty for which the court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate." Id at 980. The
Singer court expressly overruled any inconsistent statements in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962), which held that appraisal was plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
24. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1349, rev'don other grounds, 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983) (legitimate business interests of the majority in securing the best investment op-
portunity for its capital, realizing significant tax, accounting and insurance savings, and eliminat-
ing possible conflict of interest problems are proper purposes); Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-25 (Del. 1977) (cash-out merger designed solely to serve business
interests of majority shareholder has valid business purpose); Weiss, supra note 2, at 671 n.300
(business purpose test may be virtually interpreted out of existence).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/3
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the value of their shares.25
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,2 6 the Delaware Supreme Court intro-
duced the latest chapter of the squeeze-out merger story. The court
abandoned business purpose as a requirement for mergers and pro-
vided the minority shareholders with a broader standard for the deter-
mination of value in the appraisal process.27 The court's new direction
reflected its realization that the business purpose standard, as inter-
preted by the courts, offered little protection to minority shareholders.28
The decision also represented the court's acceptance of a view previ-
ously expressed by Justice Quillen: If shareholders were really com-
plaining about inadequate price for their stock, the court "should not
foster an unnecessary damage forum because of any judicial limitations
placed on the statutory appraisal procedure. Rather we should en-
courage the legislatively established valuation process to be open to
generally accepted techniques of valuation used in other areas of busi-
ness or law."29 In Weinberger, the court updated the outmoded Dela-
ware appraisal procedure to reflect modem financial and legal learning.
The court rejected the "Delaware Block" method of valuation and sub-
stituted an approach that permitted proof of value by "any techniques
or methods that are generally considered acceptable in the financial
community and otherwise admissible in court, subject only to our inter-
pretation of 8 Del. C. § 262(h)."3 0
Having attempted to cure the deficiencies that prevented a minority
shareholder from receiving a fair price in an appraisal proceeding, the
court then limited the non-appraisal remedies a minority shareholder
might pursue. 3' The court variously described this new improved ap-
praisal procedure as, "the remedy, ' 32 "the basic remedy," 33 and the
25. See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1039-40 (Del. 1979) (Quillen, J.,
dissenting).
26. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
27. Id
28. Id at 715.
29. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najiar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1040 n.12 (Del. 1979) (Quillen, J. dissenting).
See also Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 150 (Del. 1980) (Quillen, J. concurring) (sug-
gesting appraisal process can consider questions of entire fairness and motive).
30. 457 A.2d at 713.
31. Id at 715 (return to the well-established principles mandating a stockholder's recourse to
the basic remedy of appraisal).
32. Id at 703.
33. Id at 715.
Number 31
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plaintiffs "monetary remedy."3 4 Any alternative relief depended on a
showing of "fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of
corporate assets, or gross or palpable overreaching. '35
The Weinberger decision represents a distinct movement by the Del-
aware court toward the view that a shareholder has only a financial
interest in the corporation, which the majority can take so long as the
majority pays a fair price.36 By broadening a court's valuation stan-
dards, the Weinberger court sought to insure that the appraisal process
produced a "fair value," which approximated real world value. This
result would remove the prospect that an artificially low appraisal price
would tempt majority shareholders to initiate a merger transaction to
acquire the minority shareholders' interest in the company at a bargain
price.3 7
The court combined this broadened valuation standard with certain
procedural safeguards, which the opinion encouraged: full disclosure,
an independent negotiating committee, and approval of the transaction
by a majority of minority shareholders.38 This combination promotes a
bargaining process that allows the parties to decide for themselves what
is a fair price and resorts to appraisal when the parties fail to reach
agreement.39
Delaware is not alone in its attempt to reinvigorate the statutory ap-
praisal remedy. A recent New York statute40 and the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act4' both include streamlined procedures that
seek to provide dissenting shareholders fair value. They also attempt
to avoid delays, uncertainties, and legal expenses that make judicial
appraisals prohibitive for the small investors and leave them at the
mercy of a majority squeeze-out. This renewed emphasis on statutory
efforts to protect minority shareholders represents a significant turn-
about from twenty years ago when prominent commentators were writ-
34. Id at 714.
35. Id
36. Id at 703. The court's conclusion that "the remedy available under our law to minority
shareholders in a cash-out mergers [is] . . . appraisal" recognizes the propriety of excluding the
minority if fair price is paid and perhaps fair dealing. Id
37. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 11, at 1456.
38. 457 A.2d at 711-12.
39. See Burgman & Cox, Reapprairing the Rule of the Shareholder in the Modern Public Cor-
poratiorn Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freeze Outs, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 593,
652-65; see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Aci, Intro. Comment to Chapter 13 (1984).
40. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85).
41. REViSED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT, Chapter 13 (1984).
[Vol. 62:415
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ing off the appraisal remedy.42 It also represents a significant change
from five or ten years ago when federal and state courts developed al-
ternative rights for minority shareholders because the statutory proce-
dure provided so little protection for the minority.43 The following
section discusses whether this new emphasis on appraisal will be suc-
cessful in protecting minority shareholders.
II. PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE POST-
WEINBERGER APPRAISAL ERA
The Weinberger court clearly emphasized appraisal as the primary
method to resolve majority-minority disputes in squeeze-out mergers.
A corollary to the court's position is that fiduciary duty will play a re-
duced role in the regulation of fundamental corporate changes. Under
this view the wrong is not that the majority takes the minority's inter-
est, but that it takes the interest without paying fair value. To assure
fair value the court relied on the expanded appraisal standard and ex-
panded bargaining which the court encourages through its discussion
of procedural fairness. The court appeared reluctant to allow a minor-
ity shareholder to seek relief outside the appraisal process unless the
defendant's conduct makes it impossible for the appraisal standard to
work (such as where the defendant's fraud hides the value of the com-
pany or defendant's misrepresentations induce a minority shareholder
to forego the appraisal proceeding).44
While the new emphasis on appraisal in Weinberger is clear, the
court discussed the reduced role for fiduciary duty in a more confusing
manner. The court's holding continues to subject a majority share-
holder to a fiduciary duty in a squeeze-out merger, but the court sug-
gests that the usual remedy for breach of that duty is appraisal. This
interplay between breach of fiduciary duty and the appraisal remedy
merits detailed consideration because it illustrates an evolution of the
42. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 7, at 260 (appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic
advantage to the usual shareholder except in highly specialized situations).
43. See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najiar, 407 A.2d 1032 (1979) (Quillen, J., dissenting) (sugges-
tion that the Singer damage remedy was a response to insufficient appraisal procedures); Greene,
Corporate Freeze Out Mergers, A ProposedAnaysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 499 n.37 (1976) (Green
v. Santa Fe seen as a reaction to insufficient state law appraisal remedy).
44. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 480 A.2d 655, 660 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("where, as
here, there are no allegations of non-disclosure or misrepresentations, Weinberger mandates that
the plaintiffs' entire fairness claims be determined in an appraisal proceeding").
Number 3] 423
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appraisal procedure to providing a remedy for breaches of fiduciary
duty, a purpose appraisal did not originally serve.
The Weinberger court recognized that a squeeze-out merger between
a parent and a subsidiary gives rise to fiduciary obligations on the part
of the parent because the parent is on both sides of the transaction.45
The court suggested that the parent (in this case Signal Company),
could satisfy its fiduciary obligation if it structured the transaction on
an arms-length basis with an independent negotiating committee repre-
senting the subsidiary.46 This procedure would, in effect, remove the
self-dealing. Because Signal did not use this procedure the court
judged its conduct by the inherent fairness test and found that its con-
duct fell short of that standard.47
The court also affirmed the Chancellor's conclusion that the major-
ity's fiduciary duty usually requires it to carry the burden of proof that
the transaction is fair, but that an informed vote in favor of the plan by
a majority of minority shareholders entirely shifts the burden to the
plaintiff to show a lack of fairness.48 While a majority of the minority
approved the transaction in Weinberger, the vote was not an informed
one. Therefore, the court refused to shift the burden of proof.4 9
These principles of fiduciary obligation are consistent with prior Del-
aware law." The important factor in Weinberger was how fiduciary
obligations relate to remedy. Signal clearly had a fiduciary obligation
to the minority and the court found that Signal breached its duty. Ac-
cording to the court, the remedy for such a breach of duty was ap-
praisal, which is, of course, the same remedy available to the minority
if the majority had met its fiduciary duty (e.g., if the majority had used
an independent negotiating committee or obtained an informed vote of
a majority of the minority shareholders). The court did not go so far as
to say that appraisal can remedy all breaches of fiduciary duty. Indeed,
it clearly stated that additional remedies beyond appraisal may be
available "in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation,
45. 457 A.2d at 710.
46. Id at 709 n.7.
47. Id at711.
48. Id at 703.
49. Ad
50. See, ag., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (1979) (burden shifts to plaintiff if
corporate transaction approved by informed vote of majority of the minority); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 DeL Ch. 293,299, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952) (majority shareholder's duty
of fairness in merger).
[Vol. 62:415
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self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets or gross or palpable
overreaching is involved."'" Yet in Weinberger, a case that clearly in-
volved self-dealing, the court relegated the plaintiffs to an appraisal
type remedy suggesting that the Weinberger court believed that the ap-
praisal statute should provide the usual remedy for breach of fiduciary
duty.52
Commentators disagree on the capability of appraisal to provide a
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty. Victor Brudney and Marvin
Chirelstein stated:
Appraisal is predicated more on the conception of managerial incompe-
tence in valuing an old enterprise and negotiating a price for it than on
the notion of a conflict of interest which results in a diversion of a portion
of the merger proceeds to a controlling parent ... it neither serves nor is
designed to serve as a remedy for fiduciary misbehavior at which a fair-
ness challenge is directed.53
In a more recent commentary, Daniel Fischel viewed appraisal as
particularly useful in situations where the majority shareholder has a
conflict of interest. Fischel argued that appraisal can best be under-
stood as "an implied contractual term that sets the minimum price at
which the firm or a part thereof can be sold in situations where certain
groups are more likely to attempt to appropriate wealth from other
groups than to maximize the wealth of the firm."54
Weinberger suggests the Delaware's court's movement in the direc-
51. 457 A.2d at 714.
52. Id The court refers to its award as a "quasi-appraisal" remedy because the time for
perfecting the statutory appraisal right had long since passed. This remedy gives the plaintiff "fair
value" as determined under the appraisal standard, regardless of the plaintiff's failure to comply
with the procedural requirements of the appraisal statute. The court extends this same quasi-
appraisal right to any then currently litigated, pending, or proposed merger because plaintiffs in
those cases may have relied on the pre- Weinberger law and failed to perfect their right to ap-
praisal. But for any later mergers the court says "the provisions of 8 Del.C. § 262, as herein
construed, respecting the scope of an appraisal, and the means for perfecting the same, shall gov-
em the financial remedy available to minority shareholders in a cash-out merger," Id at 715. See
also Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 480 A.2d 655, 660 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("where, as here,
there are no allegations of non-disclosures or misrepresentations, Weinberger mandates that the
plaintiffs' entire fairness claims be determined in an appraised proceeding").
53. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 297, 307 (1974).
54. Fischel, supra note 4, at 876. Fischel seeks to turn appraisal remedy from an ex post
approach, which focuses on the perceived need for protection of minority shareholders once a
transaction has been announced, to an ex ante approach, which also considers the effect the rem-
edy has on the "probability . . . [that] the transaction tak[es] place, the terms on any transaction,
and the agency costs of management in the event no transaction occurs." Id at 878.
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tion of using the appraisal statute to check management conflict of in-
terests, which courts traditionally have regulated by fiduciary duty
concepts. If courts intend to use appraisal to enforce fiduciary duties
and not just to check managerial incompetence, courts and legislatures
should adjust the standard for ascertaining value and the procedural
requirements of the appraisal process because the statutes were not
written with this broader purpose in mind.
A. Standards for Determining Fair Value
The Weinberger court's updating of appraisal standards included two
elements not traditionally included in appraisal recovery: post-transac-
tion value of the merged company and rescissory-type recovery.
Courts should consider both elements if they are going to use appraisal
to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty.
Pre- Weinberger Delaware law (and the current law in other states)
determined the value of dissenters' shares immediately before the
merger and excluded any gain or loss in anticipation of the merger.55
The Weinberger court emphasized that its "all relevant factors" test in-
cluded consideration of "future prospects" of the merged corporation. 56
Commentators have read this language to support an appraisal award
based on the amount that would be realized by minority shareholders if
a third party purchased the corporation in an arms-length transac-
tion.57 Other commentators have viewed the term "all relevant factors"
as including some sort of sharing between the majority and minority of
the gain produced by the transaction.58
This broadening of the appraisal standard may reflect the change in
the purpose of appraisal statutes discussed above. Appraisal statutes
55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Replacement Volume 1983) (Court of Chancery
"shall appraise the shares determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger"). In Weinberger the court interpreted the
exception narrowly, stating that it was "designed to eliminate use ofproforma data and projec-
tions of speculative variety relating to completion of a merger." 457 A.2d at 713. Other states have
similar provisions for determining value immediately before the effectuation of the merger. See
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS § 349 (3d Ed. 1983).
56. 457 A.2d at 714.
57. See, eg., Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase
Six, 4 CARDozo L. REv. 245, 252 (1983) (Weinberger did not clearly require a parent to pay as
much for the minority interests in a subsidiary as the minority shareholder would realize if the
subsidiary were sold to a third party in an arm's-length transaction, but the opinion suggests that
the court was sympathetic to such a value measurement).
58. See Burgman & Cox, supra note 39, at 646-52.
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were designed as a remedy for a minority shareholder who had elected
to forego the opportunity to continue in the modified enterprise.59 In
that situation, a court should determine the value of the minority's in-
terest independent of any change in the value of the corporation
brought about by the transaction. A shareholder who voluntarily re-
jects the opportunity to participate in an enterprise is not entitled to
share in any potential success brought about by the change in the enter-
prise. When the majority forces the minority out and does not give the
minority the option of participation in the new enterprise, appraisal of
the minority's interest should include consideration of "future pros-
pects" of the enterprise.' Not only must the appraisal process value
the dissenter's interest in the pretransaction enterprise, but it must also
account for the value of the shareholder's right (if any) in continued
participation, which the majority has taken from the shareholder invol-
untarily. To the extent that minority shareholders have a right to con-
tinued participation, they can claim a portion of the gain created by the
transaction.61
The pretransaction standard probably would deny the minority any
portion of the gain from the transaction.6z Allocating all the gain pro-
duced in a squeeze-out merger to corporate managers and majority
shareholders may reward those who "uncover potential value increas-
ing transactions" and contribute to efficiency in the market for corpo-
rate control, which ultimately increases the welfare of shareholders as a
group.63 Such a rule, however, leaves open the possibility of harm to
59. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 505-06 (1981); supra notes 6-9
and accompanying text.
60. Whether the minority was voluntarily or involuntarily squeezed out will not always be
clear. The majority may give the minority an option to continue but on terms so unattractive that
the minority feels effectively forced out. See Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del.
1981); see also Burgman & Cox, supra note 39, at 664 (appraisal function in either obvious or
subtle force out should do more than assess the pretransaction value of a shareholder's interest).
61. See Burgman & Cox, supra note 39, at 623-52 (comparing shareholder's right to partici-
pation under theories that view shareholder as an owner or a lender of capital or under a utilita-
rian perspective). Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporation Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982) (auguing that exclusion of gain maximizes shareholders value) with Brudney, supra
note 12 (arguing for equal treatment of all shareholders when a public corporation reallocates
participation in the enterprise).
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(h) (Replacement Volume 1983); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 32 §§ 157.70 & 157.73 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW, § 623(h)(4) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1983).
63. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited- Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 928 (1982).
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the minority when the insider knows of material inside information or
when the market does not effectively value the enterprise and a control-
ling shareholder pushes through a merger to obtain shares at a bargain
price.64
Weinberger's language suggests a standard that provides minority
shareholders with at least a portion of the gain created by the transac-
tion. 5 While the opinion does not state that minority shareholders
must always receive a proportionate share or any portion of the gain,
the court's discussion of "future prospects" in the context of its treat-
ment of "fair dealing" indicates that its formula has particular use in
situations involving self-dealing by the majority shareholder. It would
be consistent with this language in Weinberger to interpret the statute
as creating a presumption that the minority shareholders should receive
a proportionate share of the gain from the merger. The majority share-
holder can rebut this presumption only if there is sufficient proof of
arms-length bargaining that otherwise distributes the gain between ma-
jority and minority shareholders. Hypothetically, a minority share-
holder may bargain away a right to continued participation in
exchange for less than a proportionate share of the gain if such a bar-
gain was necessary to induce a value-increasing transaction. In a
squeeze-out merger, where the majority shareholder selects the times
for and the terms of the transaction and does not engage in arms-length
bargaining with the minority, the court should not assume that the mi-
nority shareholders would forego all of the gain; instead the court
should resolve any doubts against the majority shareholder.
Such an approach is consistent with common law doctrine that re-
solved doubts against fiduciaries in a conflict of interest situation.66 The
Revised Model Business Corporation Act supports a similar result by
providing an exception to the appraisal statute's exclusion of gain cre-
ated by the transaction if the exclusion would be "inequitable." The
inequitable exception apparently was included for cases like Wein-
berger where there is an absence of fair dealing or fair price.67
64. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 53, at 308-09.
65. See supra notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text.
66. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF COIORATIONS § 238 (3d ed. 1983).
67. Section 13.01 of the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act defines fair value to
exclude "any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion
would be inequitable." The Official Comment to Chapter 13 of the 1983 exposure draft stated the
exception was inserted to deal with "squeeze out situations" in which the dissenter is excluded
against his will from continued participation in the altered enterprise by some method like a "cash
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The rescissory measure of recovery goes a step further.68 This stan-
dard measures the value of the minority's stock at a time subsequent to
the transaction, as is usually done in a "pure" rescission situation.69
The rescissory measure may permit minority shareholders to recover a
proportionate share of the value created by the transaction to the extent
that this increased value is reflected in the stock's value on the subse-
quent date. The same arguments advanced above to support consider-
ation of future prospects also provide support for an award based on a
rescissory measure. The rescissory remedy goes further, because it also
permits the minority shareholders to recover any increase in value of
the shares they gave up caused by events unrelated to the merger, such
as a positive change in the stock market or economy as a whole.7" Such
use of rescission is sometimes characterized as an undeserved wind-
fall.7 It is, however, a fundamental principle of the law of restitution
or unjust enrichment that a fiduciary cannot benefit from a breach of
fiduciary duty.72
Unjust enrichment principles require a defendant to return any ben-
efit gained by the infringement of another's interest or by causing a
plaintiff to suffer a loss.7 3 Yet even from an unjust enrichment perspec-
tive, the rescissory measure of recovery for squeeze-out mergers raises
some problems. If the court views the squeeze-out statutes as giving
the majority shareholder the right to take the minority's shares condi-
tioned on paying fair value, the only gain from the breach of the fiduci-
ary duty is the difference between what the majority paid for the shares
and "fair value." If compliance with fiduciary duty would not have
prevented the majority from taking the minority's interest, but only
would have changed the terms of the merger, it is difficult to attribute
merger." The final draft changed that comment to refer to Weinberge/s discussion of all relevant
factors and rescissory damages.
68. The Weinberger court created some confusion over whether rescissory damages should be
considered a part of "all relevant factors" in the appraisal process. The court also implied that
rescissory damages was among the equitable relief that the Chancellor could grant outside of the
appraisal process under the "fraud" exception. 457 A.2d at 714.
69. See G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsrmrriON §§ 3.1, 3.3 (1978).
70. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (court's use of rescissory
measures allowed former minority shareholders to recover the benefit of a rise in prices during the
period after the squeeze out).
71. See, e.g., Weiss, .upra note 57, at 253.
72. See G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTTUTION § 2.11 (1978).
73, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1983).
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subsequent market changes to the breach of fiduciary duty.7 4 In this
context, the rescissory recovery takes on a greater deterrent aspect.7 5
Courts can use the possibility of rescissory recovery to provide majority
shareholders in a conflict of interest situation an incentive to provide
"fair dealing" in a squeeze-out merger. If the majority does not pro-
vide these mechanisms, a court not only may divide the gains from the
merger in a way favorable to minority shareholders, but it may also
impose on the majority any risk of a change in the market between the
time of the transaction and the time of judgment.
B. Procedural Requirements
The expenses associated with the appraisal process and the delay in
the minority shareholders receiving any recovery under the statute also
pose significant obstacles to the use of the appraisal process as an effec-
tive remedy for breach of fiduciary duty. The Delaware statute still
requires specific procedures, such as the requirement of a demand by
the dissenters prior to the shareholder vote.76 Moreover, courts have
strictly construed these procedural requirements.77 The length of the
74. Cf. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). In Gerstle, a parent
corporation induced shareholders of a subsidiary to vote for a merger with proxies that contained
material misrepresentations. The court required the parent to share with the minority shareholder
any appreciation of the company's assets that were sold in the nine months after the merger be-
cause this was a benefit gained by misrepresentation. The court refused to allow the minority to
share in the appreciation of another asset sold nine years after the merger. The court concluded
that if there had been adequate disclosure the merger would have gone through, but on different
terms, and that the revised terms would not have included any share of the appreciation of the
asset sold nine years later. Id at 1305-06.
75. Unjust enrichment may promote deterrence but that does not make it punitive. See
Jones, The Recovery ofBenefts Gainedfrom a Breach of Contract, 99 LAw Q. REv. 443, 456 (1983)
("to be deprived of what you have gained [unjustly] can never be a penal liability. ... ).
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 262(a)&(d) (Replacement Volume 1983) (shareholder
must neither vote for nor consent to the merger and must make a written demand prior to the vote
or within 20 days after notification of the effective date of the merger if approved by the stock-
holders without a meeting).
77. One commentator has compared court interpretations of appraisal procedures to earlier
interpretations of common law pleading rules. See Weiss, supra note 2, at 653; see also Manning,
supra note 7, at 231 ("the courts have tended to be increasingly stringent in enforcing the proce-
dural letter as the statutes have grown more complex in their procedural nicety").
The Delaware legislature has amended its merger statute to require a corporation, if the merger
requires a shareholder vote, to give pre-vote notice that appraisal rights are available and to in-
clude a copy of the appraisal section of the statute. The statute also provides that the share-
holder's demand "will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of the
stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the appraisal of his shares." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (Replacement Volume 1983).
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appraisal proceedings postpones the minority shareholders receipt of
payment, costing them the time value of money.78 Minority sharehold-
ers usually have to pay their own attorneys' fees and possibly other
costs of the appraisal process and those costs reduce the ultimate value
of the award.79 While recent changes in the Delaware law provide for
the sharing of attorney's fees among all who seek appraisal, ° those fees
may still consume a significant part of any recovery.8' All of these pro-
cedural limitations may enable the majority to purchase the minority
shares at less than fair value because even if the appraisal process pro-
duces a higher value for shareholders, it may not lead to more money
in the minority shareholder's pocket.
If courts are going to use appraisal to remedy a breach of fiduciary
duty and to assure fair value, the process should reduce the
nonrecoverable costs the minority shareholder must bear. If the major-
ity has breached its fiduciary duty by standing on both sides of the
transaction, the court (or legislature) should impose the costs of the
appraisal process and plaintiffs attorneys' fees on the corporation. For
those same reasons, Delaware should follow the lead of the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act and require the corporation to pay
any undisputed value amount to minority shareholders immediately in-
stead of at the end of litigation.82
C. Summary
Without the adjustment in the value standards and procedural re-
quirements discussed above the fiduciary duty principles set out in
Weinberger, and particularly the procedural fairness mechanisms that
78. The appraisal proceeding may take months or years during which the shareholders will
not have use of their money. Interest may be included in the award, but it may only run from the
date of judgment or the date of exception to the appraiser's report. See, e.g., Meade v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 30 Del. Ch. 509, 514, 58 A.2d 415, 418 (1948) (from date judgment en-
tered); Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 486, 215 A.2d 242, 247 (1965) (from date of
exception to appraisers report).
79. The Delaware statute provides that the court may determine the costs of the appraisal
and tax it "upon the parties as the court deems equitable in the circumstance." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 262(j) (Replacement Volume 1983).
80. Id
81. Even if the court or legislature spreads the burden of attorneys' fees over more than one
shareholder, there may be difficulty in obtaining qualified legal counsel to handle the case because
an attorney's fees may be based on the amount in controversy, which may be relatively small in
appraisal proceedings.
82. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS Coap. ACT § 13.25 (1984).
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the opinion encourages, serve little purpose. If a breach of those duties
leads only to a traditional appraisal remedy, the majority shareholder
has little incentive to comply with those obligations. 83 This Article sug-
gests that the failure to follow these procedural fairness standards
should have a practical effect on how the law determines the value of
the minority's interest. If defendant's conduct prevents the independ-
ent bargaining that would permit the establishment of the fair-market
value of the minority's shares, the defendant should not complain if the
court or appraiser sets a value at the high end of a range of fairness by
awarding the minority a full proportionate share of the gain created by
the merger and also imposes the costs of appraisal on the corporation.
The Delaware court has carved out an ambitious goal for the ap-
praisal process; but appraisal may not be able to protect the minority
without legislative changes84 and continued flexible judicial interpreta-
tion.85 The procedural fairness protections discussed in Weinberger can
easily lose their effectiveness. Commentators have expressed concern
that independent negotiating committees provide little protection for
shareholder interests.86 Opinions by investment bankers, as the Wein-
berger case illustrates, do little for the minority shareholders.87 If the
court continues to permit the majority shareholders a near absolute
right to force out the minority, it should provide independent vigilance
to assure that the majority does not manipulate the appraisal process.
III. WEINBERGER AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
Even if Weinberger's expanded appraisal process provides minority
shareholders with sufficient value for their shares to justify allowing the
83. Professor Weiss has suggested that these procedural fairness standards be given some
meaning by preventing any attacks on the merger collateral to appraisal if these procedural fair-
ness standards have been met and no fraud has occurred. Weiss, supra note 57, at 259.
84. The Weinberger court's interpretation of the Delaware statute to exclude any element of
value arising from the merger differs from earlier interpretations of that language. See Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del.
1980). The statute may require amendment to clarify its meaning.
85. But see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., New Castle County, No. 5278 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19,
1983), at 51-52 (unreported decision in which Chancellor Brown gave a narrow interpretation to
the Supreme Court statement on future prospects).
86. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenl City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV.
L. REv. 597 (1982); see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (independent
director's committee decision to terminate shareholder's derivative suit requires independent busi-
ness judgment by court).
87. 457 A.2d at 708. See Steinberg & Lindahl, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 351 (1984).
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majority shareholders the option to squeeze out the minority, the same
rule should not apply to squeeze-out mergers involving closely held
corporations. The court's conclusion that the appraisal procedures pro-
vide the primary protection for minority shareholders rests on the be-
lief that shareholders in public corporations view themselves as mere
lenders of capital with only an economic interest in the corporation.88
Appraisal thus protects the cashed-out shareholders in publically held
corporations by providing them the cash equivalent for their shares.
Appraisal cannot perform the same function in closely held corpora-
tions because of the great difficulty in establishing the cash equivalency
for the minority's interests. First, shareholders in a closely held corpo-
ration have different expectations about their interest in the entity.
They view the corporation not only as an investment, but also as a
place of employment. A closely held corporation may be the share-
holder's principal or sole source of income.89 Minority shareholders
commonly think of themselves as partners who share responsibility for
and control of the corporation in a manner typically associated with
ownership.' Shareholders who are squeezed out of such enterprises,
therefore, lose more than the proportionate value of their shares. If the
closely held corporation is a family enterprise, the squeezed-out share-
holder may suffer the additional harm of a loss of prestige in family
matters.
Second, the valuation of the shares may be very difficult in closely
held corporations. There is no public market for the stock to aid the
court or appraisers in determining value.9 Items such as salaries, bo-
nuses, and retirement benefits, which are subject to the control of ma-
jority shareholders, can have a major effect on earnings in a closely
held corporation and on any determination of value.
These uncertainties increase the possibility that the majority will use
the flexibility given to a majority shareholder to propose and structure
a squeeze-out merger to take advantage of minority shareholders. The
inability of the appraisal remedy to compensate adequately for this
risk, together with the different expectations of shareholders require
tighter regulation of squeeze-out mergers in closely held corporations
than that provided by the Weinberger approach. Delaware's retreat
88. . Manning, supra note 7, at 230.
89. See generally F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORI'ORATIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1971).
90. See, ag., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
91. See F.H. O'NEAL, supra note 89, at § 2.16.
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from the Singer position increases the need to carve out specific rules
for closely held corporations either by statute or subsequent court
interpretation.92
CONCLUSION
Weinberger represents an effort to channel majority-minority
squeeze-out disputes into the appraisal process. That decision reflects a
view that minority shareholders in publicly held corporations have
only an economic interest in the corporation and that the majority may
take this interest upon paying fair value. The court attempted to pre-
vent misuse of squeeze-out mergers by broadening the appraisal stan-
dard and encouraging the use of certain fairness procedures that
increase the possibility that a majority shareholder will not unilaterally
determine the value of the minority's interest.
The court suggests that the appraisal process can remedy harm from
management's conflict of interest in a squeeze-out merger, a task which
courts (in Singer and elsewhere) have traditionally undertaken using
broad, flexible fiduciary duty concepts. If courts intend to use ap-
praisal to remedy conflicts of interest courts (or legislatures, if neces-
sary) should adjust the substantive and procedural requirements of the
appraisal process to reflect this broader purpose. Valuation should in-
clude the possibility of some sharing of gain created by the merger and,
if necessary, rescissory recovery. A presumption of proportionate shar-
ing of the gains from the merger among all shareholders, rebuttable
only by clear evidence of an independent negotiating committee, re-
solves any doubts against managers who are on both sides of the trans-
action and gives them an incentive to comply with the "fair dealing"
procedures emphasized by the court in Weinberger. In addition, the
courts and legislatures must also prevent the procedural complexity
and expense of appraisal from reducing the plaintiff's award, and thus
eliminating the minority's incentive to pursue appraisal at all.
Finally, squeeze-out mergers in closely held corporations are based
on different assumptions to which the Weinberger principles should not
apply. Thus, courts seeking to follow Weinberger should not apply its
principles to closely held corporations.
92. A number of states, including Delaware, have enacted close corporation statutes. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (Replacement Volume 1983). Such a statute is now included in the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act. These statutes, however, do not usually limit the flexibil-
ity of the majority shareholder to accomplish a merger.
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